XSF Discussion - 2019-01-03


  1. pep.

    s2s:show('hardteckno.com') | OK: Total: 60 outgoing, 48 incoming connections

  2. pep.

    bug? feature?

  3. pep.

    it's the exact same numbers as if I did without the domain, just that the connections don't get listed

  4. pep.

    oops.

  5. pep.

    wrong room

  6. Ge0rG

    Why is "Simple IoT Client" listed in the XMPP Clients list, again?

  7. Ge0rG

    It also looks like its link is broken.

  8. jonas’

    broken link -> expire it immediately

  9. Ge0rG

    What can I do to expire Pidgin?

  10. Ge0rG

    > waher.se took too long to respond. Might be a temporary failure.

  11. Ge0rG

    > broken link -> expire it immediately how long do I need to DDoS pidgin.im to get it removed?

  12. jonas’

    hrhr

  13. waqas

    Ge0rG: Try it and let us know how long it takes.

  14. Ge0rG

    is `<span style=" font-weight:600;">` correct XHTML-IM for bold?

  15. Zash

    If you allow style

  16. Ge0rG

    how is a client supposed to know that 600 = bold?

  17. jonas’

    that’s how bold is defined

  18. jonas’

    bold is just an alias for 600 or something

  19. waqas

    Ge0rG: you need a `</span>` for it to be valid

  20. jonas’

    bold Bold font weight. Same as 700.

  21. jonas’

    https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/CSS/font-weight

  22. Ge0rG

    So 600 is not-quite-bold?

  23. jonas’

    600 Semi Bold (Demi Bold)

  24. Ge0rG

    poezio will display as bold if you have font-weight:anything in the CSS

  25. waqas

    font-weight: normal == 400

  26. jonas’

    m(

  27. waqas

    Check out values here: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/CSS/font-weight#Values

  28. jonas’

    https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/CSS/font-weight#Common_weight_name_mapping rather this table, no?

  29. waqas

    Yeah

  30. waqas

    That's a nice piece of documentation

  31. Ge0rG

    Now I remember again why I hate HTML

  32. waqas

    Ge0rG: Why exactly? :)

  33. jonas’

    first, this is CSS

  34. jonas’

    second, what’s wrong with its

  35. jonas’

    second, what’s wrong with it?

  36. Ge0rG

    jonas’: CSS is a part of HTML.

  37. jonas’

    CSS is commonly used with HTML, but you can use HTML without CSS just fine, and you can use CSS with things which are not HTML (e.g. GTK or SVR)

  38. Ge0rG

    You know what they said about PHP? A fractal of bad design.

  39. jonas’

    CSS is commonly used with HTML, but you can use HTML without CSS just fine, and you can use CSS with things which are not HTML (e.g. GTK or SVG)

  40. jonas’

    I don’t see that here though

  41. waqas

    Ge0rG: You need to make peace with the fact that everything sucks, and that is unlikely to ever change :)

  42. Ge0rG

    waqas: I can't make peace with it, I can merely try to rant less.

  43. jonas’

    who’s responsible for the registries? (<https://github.com/xsf/registrar>)

  44. Guus

    jonas’ Until there is a perceived need for a more formal governing body, the functions of the XMPP Registrar shall be managed by the XMPP Extensions Editor [6]

  45. Guus

    https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0053.html

  46. ralphm set the topic to

    XSF Board Meeting | Logs: http://logs.xmpp.org/xsf/ | Agenda https://trello.com/b/Dn6IQOu0/board-meetings

  47. ralphm bangs gavel

  48. ralphm

    0. Welcome + Agenda

  49. ralphm

    Hi!

  50. ralphm

    nyco sent regrets

  51. jonas’

    Guus, thx :)

  52. Seve

    Hi

  53. Guus

    hello

  54. ralphm

    MattJ?

  55. ralphm

    Anything to add to the agenda?

  56. Seve

    Not me

  57. Guus

    I just added things to Trello

  58. Guus

    trademark, email server status

  59. Seve can't get to a computer but is on his phone

  60. ralphm

    Ok

  61. ralphm

    Me too

  62. ralphm

    1. Commitments

  63. Guus eyes dwd

  64. ralphm

    Vacation is almost over here, making more time for all things XMPP this month.

  65. ralphm

    Including finally getting the items with Peter sorted.

  66. ralphm

    2. FOSDEM / Summit

  67. ralphm

    Guus, any news on hotel?

  68. Guus

    I've send a request for a quote, but have not received one yet.

  69. Guus

    I expect that to happen today or tomorrow

  70. Guus

    after which I'll forward it to the mailing lists, much like we did last year.

  71. ralphm

    Otherwise, let's sync tomorrow on all the things

  72. Guus

    (I'm getting a quote from Thon EU again)

  73. Guus

    I've also tried to reach out to the same restaurant for the XSF Dinner

  74. Guus

    couldn't get someone on the phone, but left a message

  75. Guus

    that's it for now.

  76. ralphm

    Ok

  77. ralphm

    Thanks

  78. ralphm

    3. GSoC

  79. Seve

    Thank you Guus

  80. Guus

    Joachim expressed some interest in participating, but communication seems to have broken down over the holidays.

  81. Guus

    (GSoC, that is)

  82. Guus

    I'll follow up with him

  83. Guus

    no others have stepped forward.

  84. Guus

    Let's aim to have a go/no go in next weeks meeting?

  85. ralphm

    Ok, maybe good to repeat the request now holidays are over

  86. Guus

    I don't like battering people. I'll publicly follow up Joachim. If someone else is interested, they can chime in.

  87. ralphm

    Ok

  88. MattJ

    Hey

  89. Seve

    Good

  90. MattJ

    Sorry, here now

  91. ralphm

    5. JabberSpam trademark

  92. Guus

    hi MattJ

  93. ralphm

    (hi)

  94. ralphm

    Good comments, Guus

  95. Guus

    Ge0rG has send in an application, that has had little response. He requests action.

  96. ralphm

    I'd still like to get guidance from Peter

  97. Ge0rG

    Peter acknowledged my request some two weeks ago.

  98. ralphm

    Yes, I got a copy

  99. Guus

    interestingly, the website speaks of a Trademark WT

  100. Guus

    who's that?

  101. Ge0rG

    IIRC, last time I asked for a trademark license, it ended up being voted by Board (after Peter's principal approval)

  102. ralphm

    Currently, just Peter, I think.

  103. Guus

    (It does not explicilty name it a work team, but it suggests that there's a group of people, plus the executive directory, that are said team).

  104. ralphm

    Director

  105. Guus

    sorry 🙂

  106. MattJ

    The agreement does mention a "trademark committee" iirc

  107. Guus

    that might be it, yes.

  108. ralphm

    Adding it to the list of topics.

  109. ralphm

    Ge0rG: trying to get that resolved soon

  110. Guus

    I just created a small PR to the website, that should get Peters attention too

  111. Guus

    (regarding pending trademark applications)

  112. Guus

    Hopefully, we can gain some traction that way too.

  113. ralphm

    6. E-mail issue for seve

  114. Guus

    I'm not sure if this is just for Seve

  115. Ge0rG

    Further discussion has shown that I might need _two_ trademark permissions actually, one for the Org (requested), and another one for the "Jabber Spam Fighting Manifesto"

  116. ralphm

    I saw some discussion and request to remove from RBL

  117. Guus

    I don't know what RBL is - or if we indeed do have an issue

  118. ralphm

    Seve: did you get nyco's email?

  119. Guus

    but for several weeks, people seem to have email related issues

  120. Guus

    Seve is one, but mail from the wiki (on account creation) do not show up either

  121. Guus

    unsure if it is related

  122. ralphm

    If this keeps up we may have to start sending through a service like MailGun, I'll ask the iteam what their strategy is.

  123. Seve

    ralphm: still no new emails from XSF lists, I was thinking on waiting for a new email to check if I get them now

  124. Guus

    I'm hoping that iteam can give some kind of status update.

  125. ralphm

    Seve: ok, that was sent just before this meeting

  126. Guus

    if only to confirm or reject the notion that we have issues.

  127. ralphm

    Kev, intosi?

  128. Seve

    ralphm: then no, I still do not get them

  129. MattJ

    I think someone will have to check the mail server log again then

  130. ralphm

    Aye

  131. ralphm

    Ok, taking that up with iteam.

  132. Seve

    Thank you for this, I really appreciate that

  133. ralphm

    7. AOB?

  134. Ge0rG

    I have one AOB

  135. Guus

    no AOB from me.

  136. MattJ

    None here

  137. Ge0rG

    Tomorrow is our 20th birthday. Somebody should give a party. https://slashdot.org/story/99/01/04/1621211/open-real-time-messaging-system

  138. ralphm

    Indeed.

  139. ralphm

    Of course the party will be distributed, with Disco and lots of Jingle.

  140. Seve

    :)

  141. Ge0rG

    ralphm: are you going to MIX the drinks?

  142. Guus

    musthinkofaMIXjoke...

  143. Guus

    thanks.

  144. ralphm

    Ge0rG: sure. I'm more Pub than Sub.

  145. Ge0rG

    that sounds rather zimpy.

  146. Guus

    any practical idea's on commemorating the milestone?

  147. Guus

    apart from bad puns, obviously.

  148. Ge0rG

    Guus: somebody should write a blog post. I suggest "the half-life of instant messengers"

  149. ralphm

    I had great ideas and no time, so that didn't work out.

  150. Link Mauve

    I think we wanted to organise one with Nÿco this year.

  151. Ge0rG

    I'd volunteer, except -EBUSY

  152. Guus

    that goes for everyone, I'm afraid.

  153. ralphm

    But we might be able to do something around the Summit

  154. Ge0rG

    maybe we can crowdsource it? Collect the lifespans of IMs in a pad

  155. mrDoctorWho

    Where does gajim keep the passwords on Windows?

  156. Ge0rG

    I can manage an hour or two tomorrow to write it down

  157. mrDoctorWho

    Oops

  158. mrDoctorWho

    Sorry, wrong chat

  159. Zash

    lol https://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=15607&cid=2048739

  160. ralphm

    Hehe

  161. ralphm

    Ok, with that.

  162. ralphm

    8. Date of Next

  163. ralphm

    +1W

  164. MattJ

    wfm

  165. ralphm

    9. Close Thanks all!

  166. Seve

    +1

  167. Guus

    until we meet again!

  168. ralphm bangs gavel

  169. Seve

    Thank you!

  170. ralphm set the topic to

    XSF Discussion | Logs: http://logs.xmpp.org/xsf/ | Agenda https://trello.com/b/Dn6IQOu0/board-meetings

  171. Ge0rG

    Zash: XMPP, a story of NIH

  172. Zash

    Ge0rG: All of humanity probably

  173. Ge0rG

    So does anyone volunteer to collect data about IM networks/apps and their lifetimes?

  174. Zash

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant_messaging#History

  175. Ge0rG

    Zash: that's very coarse

  176. Ge0rG

    but maybe a full history of all abandoned networks will be less funny of a read than I imagine

  177. Ge0rG

    Oh, https://waher.se/IoTGateway/SimpleIoTClient.md is back up

  178. moparisthebest

    ha I didn't know that "The term "Instant Messenger" is a service mark of Time Warner[11] and may not be used in software not affiliated with AOL in the United States."

  179. steven

    wtf is that true??

  180. MattJ

    Things like that are why we ended up with the term "roster", when at the time everyone was talking about your "buddy list(TM)" (e.g. https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/1999/05/31/story7.html )

  181. Ge0rG

    Also why we ended up with XMPP.

  182. Zash

    Trademarks are why we can't have nice things

  183. Ge0rG

    trademarks don't expire, right?

  184. MattJ

    They do

  185. Zash

    No they don't

  186. MattJ

    i.e. if you register a trademark you have to renew it after ~10y

  187. Zash

    Right

  188. Zash

    Which they'll do, forever

  189. Ge0rG

    http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4802:35rtkj.4.26

  190. Zash

    > This search session has expired. Please start a search session again by clicking on the TRADEMARK icon, if you wish to continue.

  191. Ge0rG

    It's just the "BUDDY LIST" result, it's still registered to AOL

  192. Zash

    You also have to actively protect it as well, right? Ie go after people using it without permission and stuff.

  193. Zash

    Hm, but then I'm not sure which is whic hof ™ and ®

  194. Ge0rG

    🤷

  195. pep.

    https://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=15607&cid=2048734 "clients are quite easy to write", fast forward 20 years later

  196. Andrew Nenakhov

    Clients are indeed easy to write. It's just good clients that aren't.

  197. jonas’

    true

  198. lovetox

    also 20 years ago there was no MAM and Carbons no phones etc

  199. lovetox

    no encryption, so it was basically, download the roster, and send a message

  200. goffi

    Hi, happy new year everybody. In XEP-0060, if I have an item with id "abc", I publish an other item with it "def", then I publish a new item with the first id ("abc") which will overwrite it. if I then request items with max=1, should I get "abc" or "def" ? § 7.1.2 says that item is overwritten and § 6.5.7 says that items returned are the "most recent". So I guess it should be "abc", right ?

  201. goffi

    ralphm: ^

  202. pep.

    I think that question was also raised by edhelas a few months ago(?) I don't know if there's a clear answer

  203. Zash

    If you think about it as publishing a new item that just happens to also delete an older item, then it makes sense that the 'abc' one is the last item you get

  204. Guus

    I'd argue, without looking at the xep, that something that's overwritten is not 'new'

  205. goffi

    I got the same 2 thoughts, so it's confusing because 2 options could make sense.

  206. goffi

    the XEPs states that the mosts recents items must be returned, so even if you overwritte, the "abc" one is the more recent.

  207. goffi

    most*

  208. Guus

    The identity is not new

  209. goffi

    yes, but the item is

  210. Guus

    Is it new, or is the old one changed?

  211. Zash

    I prefer the way where I don't have to throw out all the append-only assumptions from everywhere

  212. steven

    So I've coined this idea a few times the last few weeks in random MUCs, but I'm not sure how to approach taking it further than an idea: I (and I'm sure others) have been thinking quite a bit about OMEMO key fetching and how easy it is for server admins to just serve extra keys for contacts etc. I don't think there is a single client that does not automatically accept all keys by default. (Conversations has an "expert setting" that lets you turn of accepting new keys. I think Gajim has something similar.) I've been thinking about PGP to help improve this. My personal main objection to using PGP for encrypted messaging is that I prefer to not have my private key on my device at all times (in unencrypted form) like you need for XEP-0374. Instead, one could sign OMEMO keys with a PGP key to just have to do this once for each new device. In theory, this would not need to have your PGP key on a mobile device, for example. Since you could verify the OMEMO key fingerprint on on your desktop and then sign it there. On the mobile device you only need to import your own public key and signed public keys of your contacts.

  213. pep.

    Hah, Syndace ^

  214. steven

    Not sure I'm missing something that makes this hard to use. Also I don't know if PGP is still used at all.

  215. oli

    why not encrypt the messages with pgp?

  216. pep.

    We've been discussing with Syndace a bit and trying to find solutions about your concerns on the server being able to inject devices etc.

  217. steven

    oli, because this needs the pgp private key to be available at all times

  218. steven

    OMEMO keys are single-use-case and can easily be replaced when confiscated

  219. pep.

    The idea with PGP is that the key would be stored on the server and the client can unlock it, but that has other pitfalls

  220. steven

    A PGP key is kinda like your ultimate beacon of trust 😀 We use it a lot at work f.e. for automatic deployments etc

  221. steven

    So I never have my laptop or phone have it unencrypted and need to enter a lenghty passphrase for every use.

  222. pep.

    (Well technically it could be done any way, but that's what I hear the most, that makes the most sense UX-wise)

  223. steven

    I don't think it's nice to type a passphrase for every message 😀

  224. pep.

    Not for every message

  225. Wiktor

    steven: good idea, but this would require OpenKeychain on Andoird to verify the signature and/or sign the statement

  226. steven

    pep., I don't know how XEP-0374 works, tbh. Does it just use one master key all the time? Or does it use ephemeral subkeys or so?

  227. steven

    Wiktor, to verify yes. But to sign your own mobile key, you could do manual fingerprint verification with a desktop client like Gajim and sign your mobile's OMEMO key there and send the signature to the server. (Just thinking out loud here, though.)

  228. pep.

    You choose? I don't know it that much either, I'm definitely not the reference here. I also know other people have concerns about 374, but I'm waiting on them to tell because I don't have the knowledge to back these claims

  229. Wiktor

    Yeah, actually Conversations already has similar code but using X.509 instead of OpenPGP

  230. pep.

    steven: so you want cross-signing basically right

  231. pep.

    I think the way you're trying to implement it is going a bit far

  232. steven

    pep., yeah well it's also possible of course to sign on the mobile client

  233. steven

    still you'd have to enter the passphrase only once

  234. steven

    instead of very often/every message?

  235. Syndace

    I saw you proposing that before but I didn't see a way to do that in a way which is not overkill.

  236. Syndace

    But now that I think about it again you could probably do it without too much complexity

  237. Syndace

    You might not even need GPG itself, rather a master key of any soet

  238. Syndace

    But I'm busy right now, I'll take some time to think about it later/tomorrow

  239. steven

    Syndace, well, "a master key of any sort" isn't much better. The thing is that quite some people already have some form of web of trust with PGP keys and verified identities. (The company I work for is fully remote so at our annual offsite we do a quick PGP key signing ritual. From then on we can f.e. introduce a new coworker by having him meet a single colleague that signs his key.)

  240. steven

    Basically PGP is identity-based while OMEMO is device-based. So to tie a device to an identity, it makes sense to use PGP I think.

  241. Ge0rG

    steven: PGP is a can of worms, especially but not exclusively regarding UX. Not even hardcore cryptowhores figure out all of its quirks

  242. Ge0rG

    I like the matrix idea of a master olm(?) key.

  243. steven

    Ge0rG, true. But it's an accepted default.

  244. steven

    Ge0rG, many people say the same about XMPP 😀

  245. Ge0rG

    No need to mix different crypto libraries with each other.

  246. Ge0rG

    steven [19:58]: > Ge0rG, true. But it's an accepted default. Nope. S/MIME is the accepted default.

  247. Ge0rG

    The PGP web of trust is just silly. I've verified your identity, therefore I trust you to verify other people's identities?

  248. Ge0rG

    I think that PGP has a place in xmpp indeed, but without OMEMO then.

  249. Ge0rG

    Just have an account key, exchange it with your friends, share it between all your devices, problem solved. You leak your key? All of your chat history is compromised.

  250. Ge0rG

    You lose your device? Lucky you if you still have the key / recovery password. Then you'll regain all your logs.

  251. Ge0rG

    OMEMO trust management is just madness. What do you do if you verified one of your friend's devices, but none of your own other device keys?

  252. Ge0rG

    It barely works as long as you have exactly one device and it doesn't get lost, stolen or broken.

  253. steven

    Ge0rG, I don't think you have much experience using OMEMO..

  254. steven

    I have the Conversations "paranoid mode" where I have to manually approve new device keys and it works fine.

  255. Andrew Nenakhov

    I don't like the whole idea of omemo/otr. The only improvement in it over gpg is PFS but too many drawbacks. And gpg is good enough to stop any realistic state wide spying efforts. So PFS is needed to those who REALLY has reasons not to be spied and MitMed and traffic decrypted, and we know all too well who these people are. :-/

  256. steven

    When I first start chatting with a new contact, I will just blindly hit "ok" (I'm not gonna call them to spell it out for me), but after that when I get sent new device keys, I just ask them first if they started using another client.

  257. steven

    So yeah in theory the admin could still hijack the key on the moment someone starts using a new client. That's why I'd prefer to just have my contacts' PGP keys and have them sign their OMEMO keys.

  258. Andrew Nenakhov

    So, which keys could admin hijack?

  259. Ge0rG

    steven [20:05]: > I have the Conversations "paranoid mode" > When I first start chatting with a new contact, I will just blindly hit "ok" (I'm not gonna call them to spell it out for me) I rest my case.

  260. Andrew Nenakhov

    If he hijacks your public keys, then what?

  261. steven

    Andrew Nenakhov, the admin could install a module that whenever a user adds a new device, it broadcasts a different key instead that it owns itself. Because I described that I would only ask "did you start using a new client?" without also verifying the fingerprint.

  262. steven

    Ideally I just send them the fingerprint using their first OMEMO key to verify.

  263. Ge0rG

    Andrew Nenakhov: the server Admin could add another device key to your account, or replace your key with his own.

  264. steven

    Andrew Nenakhov, he could but only if he's already doing that at the moment of the first encounter.

  265. Ge0rG

    steven: how do you ask your friends whether they got a new device? With the old key? Via SMS?

  266. steven

    Ge0rG, with the old key(s).

  267. steven

    Usually it's someone that opened the webchat for the first time or downloads a desktop client or so.

  268. Ge0rG

    steven: so if they lost their phone, you are out of luck.

  269. steven

    So yeah I should ask them to verify the fingerprint. But I don't have such highly sensitive conversations yet. Just thinking that in case I have, I'd prefer PGP instead of manually messing with fingerprints.

  270. steven

    Ge0rG, if they lost their phone and have never used a desktop/web client, yes.

  271. moparisthebest

    how do you verify their PGP key though?

  272. Ge0rG

    steven [20:11]: > in case I have, I'd prefer PGP instead of manually messing with fingerprints. Now with *that* I can totally agree.

  273. steven

    (Also note that I'm the server admin of the server my social network is on, so I should have been targeted by a hacker for shady things to happen.)

  274. steven

    moparisthebest, well, you only have to do that once. And you could delegate that to people you trust to do it thoroughly.

  275. steven

    Also for higher-profile people, their PGP keys might be publicly known and signed by a bunch of people.

  276. Andrew Nenakhov

    steven, that what fingerprints check is for, so you should verify your contact fingerprints via an independent means of communication.

  277. Wiktor

    You already specify your own PGP key in C, one can check if your contacts PGP key is signed by you

  278. steven

    Andrew Nenakhov, or with a signature of an authority you trust.

  279. Andrew Nenakhov

    Cool. So this authority could be compromised and all your struggle and pain with encryption will be for nothing.

  280. Ge0rG

    There is no trusted authority on PGP. This is what S/MIME is for...

  281. steven

    Like say some guy from The Guardian contacts you. He uses an OMEMO key. Most likely, his PGP key will be known, online on several websites and signed by people from other newspapers etc. If he signs the OMEMO key with that PGP key that I can find in multiple places with multiple signatures from other keys I can find in even more independent places, I would personally rest assured.

  282. Andrew Nenakhov

    It never ceases to amaze me how people want security and privacy but not the inconveniences that mandatory come with them.

  283. steven

    Andrew Nenakhov, there's several levels of privacy of course. Of course I'd like the conversations with my friends to be private from petty hackers and bad admins getting government orders. But I know that these conversations are not safe from high-profile cyberspecialists. That's fine. If I'm about to become a whistleblower and talking with a newspaper, I'll up my security and me tolerace to the nuisances that come with it.

  284. pep.

    > Ge0rG> There is no trusted authority on PGP. This is what S/MIME is for... Trusting that authority is another story. DANE anybody? Does S/MIME even work with that

  285. Ge0rG

    steven: you've heard of https://evil32.com/ already?

  286. Ge0rG

    pep.: there was a proposal

  287. Ge0rG

    I'd love to have an implementation of that.

  288. Ge0rG

    pep.: but not just the fingerprint, store the whole certificate in DNS

  289. steven

    > steven: you've heard of https://evil32.com/ already? Ge0rG, hmm, I don't use the shortIDs personally. Not sure how, but my `gpg --list-keys` prints full IDs.

  290. Ge0rG

    steven: the point is that the key of your journalist is fake, together with all the keys that signed it

  291. Wiktor

    steven: defaults of gpg change over time, no automated system should use short fingerprints (OpenKeychain follows this)

  292. Wiktor

    Ge0rG: not necessarily, first of all legacy sigs used long key ids not short 32 bit but for years the full fingerprint is embedded in the signature

  293. Ge0rG

    Why isn't anyone complaining that HTTP upload to a MUC exposes your domain to all muc participants?

  294. Link Mauve

    Ge0rG, because Conversations displays a picture instead of an URL.

  295. Ge0rG

    Wiktor: Chance fifty fifty

  296. moparisthebest

    your avatar exposes things too

  297. Link Mauve

    So people are not aware of that.

  298. moparisthebest

    probably a bunch of other things

  299. Link Mauve

    moparisthebest, uh, no, it doesn’t.

  300. moparisthebest

    in a different way, it lets me tell 'dwd' in one channel is the same as 'Dave' in another channel etc etc

  301. moparisthebest

    if I happen to have the same person in my roster, that too

  302. Ge0rG

    Everybody should use the same avatar!

  303. Wiktor

    Ge0rG: this is 4 years old: https://gnupg-devel.gnupg.narkive.com/Z0EFUBU7/issuer-fingerprint-was-vanity-keys

  304. Ge0rG

    Wiktor: I'm speaking about obtaining a key out of band

  305. Wiktor

    > Wiktor: Chance fifty fifty > Wiktor: I'm speaking about obtaining a key out of band ?

  306. Wiktor

    OpenKeychain uses qr codes, full fingerprint

  307. Ge0rG

    But you can't scan the fingerprint of some journalist

  308. Wiktor

    This one uses full fingerprint https://theintercept.com/staff/micah-lee/

  309. oli

    Ge0rG: i complain all the time (in my head)

  310. oli

    regarding http upload

  311. lovetox

    steven, 1. Gajim doesnt blind trust, but every single user tells me i should implement it 2. you just exchange one verification for another, you dont want to verify the omemo fingerprint, and trust an pgp signature on it, but next you dont want to verify the pgp fingerprint, then you just trust some names on a list that maybe work in a newspaper

  312. lovetox

    thats not how it works, if you want to be really secure, you have to put in the work

  313. lovetox

    there is no magic solution how a computer can tell you that you can absolutly be sure that on the other end is Human X

  314. lovetox

    at somepoint, someone has to check this in the real world

  315. oli

    video

  316. Wiktor

    lovetox, I think steven mentioned that their company's employees verify their PGP fingerprints in real world

  317. lovetox

    and then the next thing you have to realize is, that clients are not developed for 1% paranoid people

  318. lovetox

    Wiktor, yeah so they know how this works, then they can do it with omemo fingerprints

  319. lovetox

    all of your pgp signing theorys are way to complex to implement, its already hard to get omemo as is working in a usable way

  320. Wiktor

    yes, but for PGP once you sign a key the person can rotate subkeys freely and the trust is retained

  321. Wiktor

    with OMEMO there is no master key to hold device keys together

  322. Wiktor

    just clarifying what's the scope, I actually had an idea how to implement it outside clients using PGP but without modification from XMPP client developers using verified XMPP URIs (what basically is in the OMEMO QR code)

  323. lovetox

    And? do you see anyone using pgp in xmpp?

  324. Ge0rG

    Wiktor [21:16]: > with OMEMO there is no master key to hold device keys together And you have O(n*m) manual key management overhead

  325. Wiktor

    pgp has two components, identity verification and signing/encryption, pgp for xmpp as is today is used only for signing/encryption, not identity verification

  326. Ge0rG

    Where n is your devices, and m the other users.

  327. Wiktor

    you already do M when you verify your users OMEMO keys?

  328. Wiktor

    the problem is you need to repeat it for every new device key

  329. lovetox

    Thats the whole story of signal, no master key, its a feature that enables you easily add new devices

  330. lovetox

    that is what makes it usable for the masses

  331. lovetox

    now you want to "secure" that down to pgp levels

  332. lovetox

    just use pgp

  333. Wiktor

    there is no way to use pgp identity verification in xmpp currently

  334. Wiktor

    pgp fingerprints are transferred in band in all pgp xeps I've seen

  335. lovetox

    xmpp is just a transport protocol, everything pgp offers you can use

  336. lovetox

    its like email in that sense, it transports the encrypted payload, you can verify around that with keyservers or whatever crazy construct you think up

  337. Wiktor

    verification of pgp keys can be done with QR codes like with OMEMO and with OpenKeychain, nothing uses that so bascially pgp in xmpp as it is now relies on server telling the fingerprints to clients, there is no paranoid mode like in OMEMO

  338. Wiktor

    but I think what steven proposed (as far as I understood) would be to use pgp keys that already have trust between them (bidirectional signing) to sign OMEMO device keys

  339. lovetox

    and how do i get the public key to verify the sign?

  340. lovetox

    dont tell me from a server :D

  341. Wiktor

    you get the fingerprint by scanning QR code, this is identical to OMEMO

  342. Wiktor

    see: https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/QR-Codes

  343. lovetox

    ok, so you dont want to scan the omemo qr code, because thats somehow to much work, thats why we sign the omemo key, then scan the pgp key that this was sign with

  344. Wiktor

    I don't want to scan omemo keys every time contact changes devices, pgp key is stable as it is the root of trust

  345. lovetox

    to me this sounds like you just moved your problem and added complexity

  346. lovetox

    and how does a user add a new device, where does he store his secret master pgp key?

  347. moparisthebest

    you also don't really have to involve PGP to get the same thing right?

  348. lovetox

    on the phone he just lost?

  349. moparisthebest

    can't the device key you trust sign new device keys, and let you know about that?

  350. lovetox

    this is just exactly what people do since 20 years with pgp

  351. lovetox

    having a masterkey and singing sub keys

  352. Wiktor

    lovetox, usually PGP master keys are more protected than offline keys like OMEMO, e.g. my signing/encryption keys are on hardware tokens, master key is on an airgapped offline machine

  353. Wiktor

    lovetox, exactly

  354. lovetox

    Wiktor, thats not usable for the masses

  355. lovetox

    they dont store secret keys on hardware tokens

  356. lovetox

    they get a new phone

  357. lovetox

    log in, and want to chat

  358. moparisthebest

    I meant something a little less strict, ie "trust any key I've trusted for x@x.com, and any new keys for x@x.com that one of my trusted keys have signed"

  359. Wiktor

    is verified omemo for masses? but it exists

  360. lovetox

    thats what the signal protocol solved, thats why whatsapp is using this protocol for 1 billion people

  361. lovetox

    so what you describe is not an issue with omemo, its a design decision to make it usable for the masses

  362. lovetox

    if thats not secure enough just use pgp

  363. lovetox

    and if the pgp UI in clients is not what you think it could be, work on that

  364. lovetox

    instead of making omemo into something it was never designed to be

  365. Wiktor

    this is not an issue with "pgp UI" nor pgp as used for encryption, but if you say omemo should stay as close to signal as possible... okay

  366. Wiktor

    moparisthebest, yep, that sounds lightweight, there is an issue with revoking devices and tracking which device signed which one

  367. moparisthebest

    uh, revoking is just "now my trusted key for x@x.com said not to trust this other key for x@x.com" ?

  368. moparisthebest

    just have to be careful that the signed message going away alone doesn't revoke trust, since the server operator could pull that off

  369. moparisthebest

    but it could also block the revoke message, I don't think there is anything you can do about that

  370. moparisthebest

    it's at best a "my phone was stolen please don't encrypt messages to it anymore" switch

  371. Wiktor

    Yep, maybe the signatures and revocation can be embedded in XMPP QR codes as for OMEMO, that is transported out of band

  372. Wiktor

    Yes, stolen or unused anymore

  373. moparisthebest

    yea that'd be pretty great

  374. Wiktor

    There is alternative to revocations - re-signing expiring signatures every N weeks or so

  375. Wiktor

    JWTs work like that... a little :)

  376. moparisthebest

    then an evil server op can revoke keys though

  377. moparisthebest

    trying to decide if that's a problem, I mean they can also just block messages

  378. Wiktor

    yeah

  379. Wiktor

    but putting these signatures in random messages would hide them :)