End to End Encryption SIG - 2024-10-03


  1. phryk

    moparisthebest, skye: The attacker wouldn't be able to read anything from *before* they joined tho.

  2. phryk

    so, if anything from such a chat is leaked you have some assurance that it was someone who was in the room at the time. Not a scenario that will show up in most threat models, but I wouldn't say it's useless *per se*.

  3. phryk

    jesus, that was in *march*? 😀

  4. moparisthebest

    I think you just proved the point that forbidding future joiners from reading past history in public rooms would be bad, so thanks 😁

  5. phryk

    still, depends on your threat model.

  6. phryk

    might add some real world value with semi-ephemeral recruitment channels for surreptitious groups. recruit in blocks, delete channel after a block is complete, create new channel. reduces risk for new inductees.

  7. moparisthebest

    It certainly doesn't have *no* use ever, just no use for fully public channels like this one

  8. phryk

    no, that definitely not. but i think the use-case of moving someone over into a more secure communication environment shouldn't be overlooked. 🙂

  9. moparisthebest

    systems like slack let you choose when you invite people to the channel "show all/none/hour of history" you don't need e2e for this, just mam filtering basically

  10. phryk

    i'm thinking about state-level actors, so that might not help if they can just get the data from slack directly. also, the partial attribution can help identify infiltrators.

  11. skye

    Ok